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Lord Bowen once sagely remarked: "Law should follow busi-
ness." 1 The history of the law is replete with examples of its
recognition of this duty. One of these may be found in the
early history of the law merchant in England. This system
of law, as is of course well known, was a series of customs em-
ployed by merchants in mercantile transactions. It contained at
least three doctrines foreign to the common law, which, being a
*hard and fast system, naturally felt an aversion to the foreign
intruder. But even the inelastic common law was compelled to
follow business, and to allow the law merchant to become a
vital force in the legal system of England, modified in external
appearance, it is true, by certain fictions and engrafted forms.
Perhaps a better example of the remark quoted is found in the
growth of patent and trade-mark law in the United States. The
history of the law of patents runs back to the royal grants of
monopolies in England. The colonies on this side of the Atlan-
tic, for the most part, recognized the necessity of granting patent
rights, and among the first of the constitutional grants to Con-
gress is the power of securing to inventors for a limited time
the exclusive right to their inventions. Under the stimulus of this
protection thus given, the inventors of America rapidly gave to
the world such epoch-making inventions as the cotton-gin, the
harvester, -the telegraph, the telephone and the electric light.
'Bigelow, Bills,, Notes and Cheques, 2nd ed., p. 7.
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The use made of these inventions has produced an expansion
of business which is one of the most remarkable achievements of
the last and present centuries.
This expansion of business demonstrated the value of patent
and trade-mark rights. The profits accruing to the several own..
ers of the patents and the manufacturers of their inventions led
many to imitate and to seek by devious and unfair means to
draw to themselves a part of the profits thus being won. To
render more secure the possession of their rights, manufacturers,
and merchants in general, early in the history of our commercial
era came to employ certain arbitrary marks by way of a trade-
mark. Men of business clearly perceived the value of such
marks, and that a right of property might be secured therein.
As early as 1742, the question was raised in an English case,
wherein an injunction was sought to restrain one trader from
using the same mark as another, and it is to be clearly noted that
such injunction was denied.
2 Some half a century later, how-
ever, Lord Mansfield asserted the rights of property in a trade-
mark, and granted an injunction to protect such right.
3
From this beginning in England there grew up both in that
country and in ours a considerable body of law dealing with the
subject of trade-marks, defining what may be and what may not
be a valid trade-mark, and under what circumstances an injunc-
tion may issue to preserve to a given manufacturer or merchant,
the proprietary right in an arbitrary sign which he claims as a
trade-mark. It is comnion knowledge that this branch of the
law has been noticeably technical and narrow. The law was
feeling its way along the path which had been previously estab-
lished by busindss, but for many years it was a long way behind.
Courts at first felt the necessity of finding a trade-mark in the
technical sense before granting relief. Other courts refused
relief in cases where arbitrary marks or signs had been used on
the ground that they were employed by manufacturers or mer-
chants to distinguish grade or quality rather than a particular
source of manufacture. Finally, in 1877, a beginning was made
to break away from the previous technical interpretation of the
law. In other words, business was beginning to influence law,
and to compel the latter to approach more nearly to the former's
2 Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atkyn's Reports, 484.
3 Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Douglas's Reports, 393.
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necessities. At the risk of stating matters already known by
the majority of lawyers, I quote brifiv from what is considered
to be the fundamental opinion in the United States. The sen-
tences commonly referred to are -these: "Nor is it necessary, in
order to give a right to an injunction, that a specific trade-mark
should be infringed; but it is sufficient that the court is satisfied
that there was an intent on the part of the respondent to palm
off his goods as the goods of the complainant, and that he per-
sists in so doing after being requested to desist." 4 Six years
later, this doctrine was reiterated and more firmly grounded in a
state court's opinion.5
There are, then, two kinds of protection afforded every manu-
facturer or merchant who is building up a business reputation
of value, regardless of how large or small his business may be.
Ist. There is the technical trade-mark, which is the fanciful
application of some new or old name or mark to a particular
line of goods which is being advertised. These marks are pro-
tected by federal and state statutes if properly registered. There
are a great many limitations to technical trade-marks, owing to
the fact that under the statutes and rulings of the courts, these
trade-marks must not be descriptive, geographical or deceptive
words.
2nd. There is the trade name, label, or design, established by
every manufacturing company through its use of that name,
label, or design in the selling of its goods, and this trade name,
label, or design, which may be geographical or otherwise, coupled
with what is known as the doctrine of unfair trade, is a broader
and more efficient means of protecting the ordinary manufac-
turer or merchant
The foregoing traces historically the growth of the law to the
beginning of the modern dbctrine of unfair trade. The entire
theory of the law of trade-marks has always been that no man
should be permitted to palm off his goods as those of another.
By means of trade-marks, a certain degree of protection had been
given. As shown, however, this protection was very inadequate,
and in some instances could not be invoked at all. For example,
during the life of a valid trade-mark an extensive business might
be built up by judicious advertising and honorable dealing. With
4 McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245.
5.Avery v. Meikle, 81 Ky. 75.
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the expiration of the trade-mark right, this good will and
established business would become entirely lost to its former
owner; or a party might build tip an extensive business upon
goods which were identified by some peculiarity of shape or
style of wrapper, or the distinctive mark placed upon his goods
might be a geographical name, or the name of an individual. In
these latter instances, the technical law of trade-marks would
not afford protection or relief against dishonest practices of un-
scrupulous competitors. Competition does not justify this situ-
ation. The common law has always been a friend of competition.
But competition must be honest, and a dishonest competition is
one form of fraud. In seeking the principle by which relief
might be granted in a case of unfair competition, a unique and
peculiar doctrine has been evolved by the courts. This doctrine
is, that words in common use, geographical terms or proper
names, while they may not be appropriated exclusively in their
primary meaning, may come to have a secondary meaning which
legitimately belongs exclusively to the person who has created
and developed that meaning. In such meaning of such term,
there is held to be a property right. For illustration, a new manu-
facturer by the name of Baker begins the manufacture of Thoco-
late. He has the undoubted right to label in some way his wares
with his own name. There can be no exclusive appropriation of
the proper name Baker. In marketing his wares, however, he is
not allowed to label them "Baker's Chocolates," if this connota-
tion of words has been previously appropriated by another Baker,
and has come to identify in the minds of the public generally the
chocolate manufactured by the original manufacturer. The new
manufacturer may label his package, "Made by Baker," 6 but
not "Baker's Chocolates," and his style of wrapper or package
must not simulate that of the first Baker. Another illustration
which may serve to make this clear is the instance of the Waltham
Watch, manufactured originally by an 'inhabitant of that city,
and labelled with the proper name of "Waltham." There can be
no exclusive appropriation of the geographical name "Waltham,"
and any other inhabitant of that city is at liberty to engage in
the manufacture of watches, but he cannot make use of the term
"Waltham" in such a way as to lead the public to believe that his
watch is that of the original manufacturer. The term "Waltham,"
6 Walter Baker Co. z'. Sanders, 8o Fed. 889.
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as applied to a watch, has come to have a secondary meaning,
and identifies in the mind of the public the watch of the first
producer.
There are numerous illustrations where one manufacturer,
striving to gain advantage over some other manufacturer, has
sold his business and his reputation to another manufacturing
concern, and then within a short period of time has commenced
to manufacture similar goods in the same town or same locality,
and in this manner gains advantage which is entirely unfair,
which, in my judgment, is the worst form of illegitimate competi-
tion.
Another instructive example of the application of the doctrine
of unfair trade is seen in the case of a manufacturer whose
patent has expired. It is in such a case that the doctrine of un-
fair trade, founded upon the secondary meaning of a word or
name, applied to an article of manufacture, manifests its perfect
work. For example, a manufacturer may place upon the market
a patented article, which he calls the Singer Sewing Machine.
After the expiration of the patent another manufacturer has the
right to make and sell an article of the same form. Furthermore.
he has the right to use the term "Singer," as applied to his ma-
chine. The doctrine of unfair trade, however, places this restric-
tion upon him, viz: that he must in some adequate way clearly
distinguish his article from that made by the original manu-
facturer.7
The only fair and legitimate way of utilizing a ready selling
article or device, the demand for which has been established, is
for the new manufacturer to so dress that device, so name, and
so advertise it as to distinguish it clearly and distinctly from the
one which is already in the field, and which is entitled to its
own reputation, and by this distinct method, create a demand,
and by originality of thought, build up a reputation for his own
goods which will outstrip all competition, and eliminate him from
becoming an imitator and a parasite, who would feed upon the
reputation of another.
The cases cited, and many others which might be quoted, show
how some American- courts have applied the doctrine of unfair
competition. In these cases, it is held, there must appear, first,
that the complainant has built up a valuable business, and that
7 Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. i6g.
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there is some particular word, name or characteristic applied to his
wares, which serves to identify them in the minds of the public
as being of his manufacture; second, it must appear that the
defendant, by an imitation of complainant's mark or name, has
sought to create the impression that his wares are of the com-
plainant's manufacture; and third, the public must be deceived
by this pretense. Some courts lay great stress upon the fact that
in an unfair competition case there must be alleged and proved
the fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant. As is said in
one case: "This suit is based on fraud. Its foundation is unfair,
fraudulent competition, and the intent to deceive is an indispensa-
ble element of the fraud which warrants the relief sought. This
intent, and the fraud in which it inheres, may be, and generally
must be, proved by circumstances, by facts, by sales, by a course
of action; but the facts and circumstances which establish it must
be such that the fraud and the intent to deceive the public are
fairly inferable from them." 8
Whatever the courts mean by this or similar language, on
principle it should be sufficient if the defendant's goods, as they
appear when placed on the market, deceive. This being true,
evidence ought not to be required to prove an intent to deceive.
If the average reasonable man would be deceived by the simulated
appearance of the defendant's goods, then the defendant should
be conclusively presumed to have intended a deception, and this
is tantamount to saying that intent should not form a determining
element in a case of unfair competition. It is also said that the
public must be deceived. This, doubtless, is based upon the
assumption that damages must be proved by the complainant
before he can maintain his cause of action and secure an injunc-
tion. If it -means that the public must be actually damaged in
the sense that inferior goods are foisted upon it in place of com-
plainant's articles of superior merit, then the proposition is un-
sound. For example, it is conceivable that a dealer of a secret
preparation might have his wares compounded by a given chemist,
and that another business rival might secure the identical prepara-
tion from the same chemist, and place it upon the market. The
public, in such a case, would receive from both dealers the same
article, but an action for unfair competition should lie, if the
business rival has so labelled or wrapped his article that the pub-
- Gorhiam Mfg. Co. v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Drygoods Co., I4 Fed. 243.
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lic believe it to be the article which has been previously purchased
from the original dealer. In 1877, an American writer, speaking
of the doctrine under consideration, said: "The interference of
courts of equity, instead of being founded upon the theory of
protection to the owner of trade-marks, is now supported mainly
to prevent frauds upon the public." ' This, it is submitted, is
not the way in which business regards the problem, nor is it
the way in which the law should approach the question. In
seeking to give the complainant relief, neither the mental attitude
of the defendant, nor the position of the public should be re-
garded as necessarily determinitive. The primary question should
be: "Has the defendant sought to palm off upon the public his
goods as being the goods of the complainant?" If that is the
case, then an injunction shovild issue.
It has been said that "The law should follow business." A
business may be almost world-wide in scope, or it may be confined
to a comparatively restricted area. If the doctrine of unfair trade
is to meet business necessities, it must also be elastic and broad
enough to protect trade wherever found, and irrespective of its
extent. For example, there may be a case in which a local cigar
manufacturer is placing on the market, within a limited terri-
tory, a brand of cigars bearing a particular label. In the case in
question, the label was the word "She," in large letters, pasted
upon the inside of the box. These labels were not designed
by the manufacturer of the cigars, but were a stock label, pur-
chased from a manufacturer in New York, who had made the
same for sale generally to dealers. The complainant dealer had
purchased a number of these labels, and, as the exclusive dealer
in "She" cigars in this locality, had put upon the market a large
quantity of cigars of this brand. The sale of these cigars was
confined to a number of counties in a given state. The defendant
purchased a number of the same labels, and put upon the market
a brand of "She" cigars in the same'locality. The court in grant-
ing an injunction says: "But aside from the law of trade-marks,
courts will protect trade names or reputations, although not regis-
tered or properly selected as trade-marks, on the broad ground
of enforcing justice and protecting one in the fruits of his toil.
This is all bottomed on the principle of common business integ-
rity, and proceeds on the theory that, while the primary and corn-
9 Coddington Digest, Sec. 36.
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mon use of a word or phrase may not be appropriated exclusively,
there may be a secondary meaning or construction which will
belong to the person who has developed it. lit this secondary
meaning, there may be a property right." 10 An injunction was
granted to protect complainant against unfair competition, al-
though his trade was restricted territorially.
In view of what has been said, it would perhaps be thought
that the doctrine of unfair competition is fully developed and
well understood by the courts. True, it is comparatively a new
doctrine, but business expansion in the last forty years has
been so rapid that very many cases have come before the courts
for adjudication, and a number of excellent precedents have been
established. Many courts have treated the question conscien-
tiously and broadly, and have planted their decisions upon the
rock of commercial integrity and honor. It must not be thought,
however, that the doctrine is yet fully grown or perfectly under-
stood, for it is still in its infancy. Not infrequently may be found
a decision which appears to show little or no comprehension of
the broad features of the doctrine, or of its relation to the ex-
panding needs of a commercial world. In a very recent case 1
the majority of the court seems to have absolutely missed the
point at issue, and to have taken a distinct step backward, rather
than to the front. The facts of the case are these: In i89i, the
complainant commenced to make and put upon the market a
prepared roofing material of felt, saturated with a gum com-
posed of the residuum of animal fats. The product resembled
rubber, and the name "Ruberoid" was applied as a trade-mark,
and was duly registered in the U. S. Patent Office in i9oi. An
extensive business was built up by advertising and otherwise. In
i9o4, the defendant put upon the market a roofing of similar
appearance and composition, except that vegetable oils were
used in treating the felt, instead of animal fats, and applied the
name "Rubber-O" thereto. Complainant's attorney, recognizing
the growth of the doctrine of unfair competition, brought his
action, as is frequently done of late, upon two grounds: First,
infringement of trade-mark; and, second, unfair competition, in
that the defendant, by the use of the word "Rubber-O," had put
upon the market a product calculated to deceive the public, when
10 Sarfor v. Schaden, 125 Iowa, 696.
11 Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co. v. Standard Paint Co., 163 Fed. 977.
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buying it into the belief that they were buying the roofing of the
complainant. To the very great credit of the trial court, it must
be said that the complainant had a decree. On appeal, the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of
the trial court, and ordered the bill dismissed. The astounding
ground of this decision is, first, that "Ruberoid" cannot be ap-
propriated as a trade-mark for a roofing such as complainant had
manufactured. This was held to be so for the reason that it is
merely a mis-spelling of "Rubberoid," which is a common descrip-
tive term, the use of which belongs to the public. The soundness
of the decision on this point may well be questioned; but it is
not the part of the court's holding which is most subject to
criticism. In dealing with the complainant's second count, the
court employs this language: "We discover nothing in defend-
ant's conduct justifying the charge of unfair competition. In the
last analysis, the charge rests solely on the use of the word
'Rubber-O' and the similarity thereof to 'Ruberoid,' or its
equivalent, rubberoid. * * * The word rubberoid is part of the
common heritage, and all who can truthfully apply it to their
products are entitled to do so, taking due care that they do not
otherwise trespass on the rights of competitiors. The defendant
being entitled to the proper use of the word rubberoid, the com-
plainant cannot justly complain of the use of 'Rubber-O.'"
From the above quotation, it will be seen that the court entirely
ignores the secondary signification of the word "Ruberoid," in
that such term had come to mean, in the minds of the public, a
roofing of complainant's manufacture, and by so doing, practic-
ally destroys the trade reputation of an enormous industry by
allowing it to be pirated. The evidence showed conclusively that
the public had been. misled by the defendant's use of the word
"Rubber-O," complainant's sales having decreased eight thou-
sand dollars in the territory where the latter article was sold, and
nowhere else. This was found as a fact by the lower court, and
should have been conclusive to establish the fact that the public
was misled by the defendant's term "Rubber-O." The only dis-
coverable basis upon which the appellate court's decision may be
rested with any degree of propriety grows out of the fact that
defendant stamped upon its roofing its name as manufacturer.
All these matters are dealt with in a thoroughly effective way
by the dissenting opinion. It is there said: "The striking simi-
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larity between the words 'Rubber-O' and 'Ruberoid'; the many
dissimilar names open to the defendant, the long established repu-
tation and extensive sales of complainant's 'Ruberoid,' the evi-
dent probability and the evidence of confusion of the trade by the
use of the word 'Rubber-O' and the decrease of the complain-
ant's sales after the defendant commenced to use it, leave no
doubt in my mind that the court below was right in its conclu-
sion that the purpose of the conception and use of the word
'Rubber-O' by the defendant, was to palm off its product as
that of the complainant, and that it has been accomplishing this
purpose." Answering the suggestion that "Ruberoid" and "Rub-
beroid" are the same, the learned judge says: "'Ruber-oid'
sounds as different from 'rubberoid' as 'ruble' from 'rubble.' It
was not spelled in the same way, and when written or printed it
had a strikingly different appearance. There is no more striking
method of differentiating words than by changing the spelling.
Witness 'uneeda' in contrast with 'youneeda.' The absence of a
single letter destroys the identity and the similarity of appearance
and signification of many words. 'Tough' is not 'trough :' 'cow'
is not 'crow;' 'rob' is not 'robe;' 'robin' is not 'robbin;' 'robing' is
not 'robbing;' 'ruble' is not 'rubble;' and 'ruberoid' is not 'rub-
beroid."'
The effect of the dissenting judge's reasoning is certainly hard
to overcome, but even granting that 'ruberoid" is not subject to
valid appropriation as a trade-mark, still complainant should win.
For as is further pointed out in the dissenting opinion, "it is the
duty and practice of courts of equity to enjoin the use of de-
scriptive and geographical terms by one competitor for the pur-
pose of filching the trade of another," citing numerous authori-
ties. Further, "the general rule is that one may not use his own
name even to sell his goods as those of another." These are
well known propositions to one familiar with the general princi-
ples of the law of unfair trade, and demonstrate that the dis-
senting judge is right, and the majority opinion almost absurdly
wrong. A failure to appreciate business needs subjects the en-
terprises of the entire country to the hazard of a rule, unjust,
illogical and wrong, as above pointed out, particularly when
the judge below, who should be judge of the facts, and, in addi-
tion, an able dissenting judge, holds that a case of unfair competi-
tion was made out, although an equal number of judges who
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happened, by virtue of their position, to be in control of the situ-
-ation, hold that no rights had been violated by these unfair trade
methods. But, happily, such decisions are becoming less frequent,
and it is to be hoped this unfair precedent will not be followed.
The law is following business more closely all the time.
Whether a man's trade is country-wide, state-wide, or world-
wide, the law should and does in an increasing degree protect
him in that trade. We can now congratulate ourselves that no
other development of any branch of the law is based so much on
the business integrity, common honesty and justice as this cli-
max of trade-mark law, known as the law of unfair competition,
particularly in its secondary sense. This principle of the law
strives to prevent all manufacturers or dealers, starting into new
enterprises, from using articles dressed similarly to those already
on the market, whether in design or label, or design of goods,
prevent the use of advertising literature or cuts resembling those
of an old manufacturer or dealer, and, most of all, obviate, if
possible, the selling out to another concern of an enterprise and
afterwards establishing a business in the same locality in the
same line with an intention at the time of gaining benefit as a
result of the former reputation built up by the seller, and his pre-
vious business experience, and Which is now legitimately owned
by the one to whom he sold. Unless both maker and purchaser
can count on an impartial enforcement of this principle, neither
the manufacturer nor the dealer can win and maintain a reputa-
tion, nor the purchaser rely upon the advertising by-which he
purchases his goods.
It is not urged that the doctrine of unfair competition be car-
ried to extremes. In this day of monopolies and trusts, the public
is a quasi-party to every suit involving a business enterprise, and
the rights of such party must be safeguarded. However, there is
little likelihood of discouraging legitimate business, so long as
the doctrine of unfair trade compels each man, so far as compe-
tition with his fellow is concerned, to stand or fall by his own
merit and ingenuity.
In this state of the development of the law of unfair trade, it
is sincerely to be hoped that there will be no suggestion made that
the law be codified. We have at present a broad, general, elastic
doctrine. It is being adapted to the needs of modern business in
a reasonably successful manner. As.the needs of business change,
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so may this doctrine be changed. It will be remembered that the
Trade Mark Act of July, i87o, was declared unconstitutional.1
2 It
will also be recalled that under the United States Trade-Mark
Registration Act of i88i, there were many enterprises built up
in the United States. This law was, in i9o3, '3 declared so limit-
ed in scope, so far as protection of trade was concerned, as to be
practically futile; so much so that the old law was repealed, and
in April, 1905, a new statute enacted, which in its scope does not
adequately meet business conditions. Modern business should be
subjected to no more hazards of a similar character; but the law
of unfair trade should be allowed to take its normal course of
development, being applied, as each case arises, by careful, well-
informed judges, who are alive to the truth of the saying: "The
law should follow business."
Wallace R. Lane.
12 Trade Mark Cases, ioo U. S. 82.
"3 Warner v. Searle & Hereth Co., 191 U. S. 295.
